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1 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
CENSORSHIP IN THE GUISE OF AUTHORSHIP: 
HARMONIZING COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
HON. M. MARGARET MCKEOWN* 
Greetings from what I call the “digital circuit”—the Ninth Circuit spans 
the west coast from San Diego, a center of the wireless world, to Silicon 
Valley and San Francisco’s Market Street, where Uber and Twitter thrive, 
onward to the Portland tech corridor with Intel, and all the way through 
Seattle’s tech-rich environment, where Microsoft, Amazon, and many others 
have their headquarters. Inland, our circuit covers Idaho, where Micron had 
its roots, and the growing tech centers in Arizona and Nevada. Some say we 
are the “Hollywood circuit,” and others say the “left coast circuit,” but I think 
that the moniker of “digital circuit,” or “tech circuit,” is particularly 
appropriate for this lecture. 
It is almost a cliché to say that copyright and the First Amendment are 
both in tension and in synergy with each other.1  While this observation is 
broadly true, its specific implications are often muddled. I suggest that the 
most discussed tension between copyright and the First Amendment—
sometimes dubbed “crowding out”2—is overblown.  Instead, we should 
focus on a more real and pressing tension.  That tension is the growing 
number of claims that invoke copyright protection to remedy a broad array 
of personal harms—such as invasion of privacy—and in the process tromp 
on the First Amendment.  In simple terms, a trumped up copyright claim 
cannot justify censorship in the guise of authorship. 
I will first sketch the background of the copyright/First Amendment 
debate and then turn to Garcia v. Google,3 a case that highlights the 
 
 *  Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. This article is adapted from 
remarks delivered on September 25, 2015, at the Chicago-Kent Supreme Court IP Review. Judge 
McKeown thanks her law clerk, Dan Walters (Michigan 2012), for his research assistance. 
 1.  See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, or 
Uneasy Allies?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831, 833 (2010); David S. Olson, First Amendment Interests 
and Copyright Accommodations, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1393, 1395 (2009). 
 2.  See, e.g., David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 281, 281 (2004). 
 3.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
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censorship tension. I want to touch on several other examples percolating in 
the federal courts and suggest why copyright is becoming a go-to tool to 
remedy invasions of privacy and other harms. Finally, I will return to 
copyright and First Amendment basics and reflect on what they teach us 
about this censorship tension. 
I.   THE TENSIONS IN COPYRIGHT 
The longstanding rationale of copyright is that it incentivizes the 
creation of new expression by guaranteeing a limited monopoly on the 
reproduction of expressive works.4 Of course, there are other rationales as 
well. By definition, the limits on reproduction in copyright put boundaries 
on speech.5 Yet the Supreme Court has said that “copyright itself can be the 
engine of free expression.”6  Traditionally, however, for free speech 
principles we look to the First Amendment, which says in categorical terms 
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press . . . .”7 
In the face of these potentially competing values, scholars have long 
argued that there is an inherent conflict that smothers speech when 
intellectual property rights gain too much traction.  Professor McGowan of 
the University of San Diego—who does not embrace the theory—explains it 
this way: public expression can be “crowded out” by the ever-expanding 
scope of copyright coverage.8 This pressure, the argument goes, constrains 
diversity of speech and hampers a robust public domain.  Melville Nimmer 
identified “definitional balancing” and the “idea/expression dichotomy” as 
answers to this conflict, and lawyers and scholars remain wedded to this 
effort to balance between competing values at stake in each legal regime.9 
 
 4.  See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (calling copyright an “engine of free 
expression”); see also Olson, supra note 1, at 1395–96 (“[A]lthough copyright does give exclusive rights 
to authors, these rights incentivize authors to produce many more works than would be produced absent 
the copyright regime. Thus, the argument goes, copyright law, on net, greatly encourages the production 
of speech.”). 
 5.  Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual 
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 165–66 (1998) (“Copyright law restricts speech: it restricts you from 
writing, painting, publicly performing, or otherwise communicating what you please. If your speech 
copies ours, and if the copying uses our ‘expression,’ not merely our ideas or facts that we have 
uncovered, the speech can be enjoined and punished, civilly and sometimes criminally.”). 
 6.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
 7.  U.S. CONST. amend I. 
 8.  McGowan, supra note 2, at 281. 
 9.  Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright after Golan v. Holder, 60 
UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1085–86 (2013) (citing Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First 
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1189–1200 (1970)). 
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In practice, the results of giving effect to this balance have been 
anything but balanced—courts have routinely rejected this version of the 
conflict argument.  According to one study that looked at over thirty 
published copyright/speech cases for a 35-year period—between 1967 and 
2002—in all but two of those cases, courts rejected this conflict thesis on 
various bases.10 With few exceptions, the ship has sailed on the “crowding 
out” argument. 
Case in point: in 2003, the Supreme Court was asked, metaphorically, 
to “Free Mickey Mouse,” and invalidate a dramatic extension of the 
copyright term.11  Instead the Court wrote in Eldred v. Ashcroft that 
“copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with free speech 
principles,”12 and noted that “copyright law contains built-in First 
Amendment accommodations.”13 The Court ultimately concluded that 
“when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional contours of 
copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”14 
Returning to the same theme almost a decade later in Golan v. Holder,15 
the Court held that Congress did not violate the First Amendment by 
extending copyright protection to works previously in the public domain. 
Again, the Court referenced the “traditional contours” of copyright 
protection and identified the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use 
defense as “built-in” First Amendment accommodations.”16 
These “built-in” accommodations are indeed well equipped to further 
some of the most important values animating the First Amendment. The 
idea/expression dichotomy is intended to insulate “ideas” from copyright 
protection and give statutory protection only to the expression or 
representation of ideas.17  This division helps ensure discourse about ideas—
which is a core concern of the First Amendment.  One might argue with 
where courts have drawn the line, but it is a line with some definition and 
fair predictability. 
 
 10.  Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech after Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1275, 1281 (2003). 
 11.  Free Mickey Mouse, The Economist (Oct. 10, 2002), 
http://www.economist.com/node/1378700 (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
 12.  537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 221. 
 15.  132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) 
 16.  Id. at 890 (citation omitted). 
 17.  Netanel, supra note 9, at 1085–86. 
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The fair use defense18 likewise promotes free speech and new 
expression—it permits the use of copyrighted material for limited and 
transformative uses.19 But this defense defies line drawing.  Although the 
Supreme Court identified fair use as a First Amendment “accommodation,”20 
even decades ago one court called it one of the most “troublesome” doctrines 
in terms of application.21  Academics have characterized it as “billowing 
white goo”22 or “naught but a fairy tale.”23 Even so, this view is not uniform. 
Professor Pamela Samuelson argues that “fair use law is both more coherent 
and more predictable than many commentators have perceived.”24 One thing 
is for sure: the statute delineating the fair use factors might be described as a 
“mini lawyers’ relief act,” given the millions of dollars spent divining its 
application. 
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, to hear from Professor Christopher 
Eisgruber—an outsider to copyright law but an insider to free speech 
jurisprudence—that there is something puzzling about the purported tension 
between copyright and the First Amendment: 
There is a good reason why courts have traditionally regarded copyright 
law as consistent with the Free Speech Clause. Most of Free Speech law 
rests on a concern about [government suppressing political or sensitive 
speech, such as speech on sex & religion]. Copyright is not censorious in 
this way . . . . Copyright does not pick and choose among ideas and 
subject-matters. Smutty pictures and subversive tracts get copyright 
protection along with reverent hymns and patriotic speeches.25 
Eisgruber’s statement largely rings true, and his observation helps us 
understand why cases like Eldred didn’t go anywhere. But in my view, there 
is another story to tell. Copyright as censorship does exist, and it is different. 
 
 18.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). The statutory fair use factors include the “purpose and character 
of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes,” 
the “nature of the copyrighted work,” the “amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole,” and the “effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.” Id. 
 19.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (describing the transformative 
use factor as inquiring whether the work “adds something new”); see also Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 
F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2013) (calling “transformation” the “key factor in fair use”). 
 20.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
 21.  Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 22.  Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587 (2008). 
 23.  David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” & Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 263, 287 (2003). 
 24.  Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2541 (2009). 
 25.  Christopher L. Eisgruber, Censorship, Copyright, and Free Speech: Some Tentative Skepticism 
About the Campaign to Impose First Amendment Restrictions on Copyright Law, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 17, 18–19 (2003). 
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What has been lost in the debate about “Freeing Mickey” is that there 
is another manifestation of tension between copyright and the First 
Amendment—one that presents a far more compelling case for judicial 
intervention to protect freedom of speech from prior restraint and censorship. 
I refer to the use of copyright injunctions to impose what amounts to prior 
restraints on offensive, unpopular or sensitive speech.  These kinds of cases 
look, feel and smell like the real First Amendment cases.  They are 
fundamentally about censorship of unpopular speech. 
II.  ILLUSTRATING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TENSION: GARCIA V. 
GOOGLE 
I turn now to Garcia v. Google, an illustrative case that was decided by 
the Ninth Circuit en banc last spring,26 to demonstrate in concrete fashion the 
ways that copyright is being used to promote censorship of ideas, as well as 
the judicial response. 
Cindy Lee Garcia was paid $500 for a bit part in what she thought was 
an adventure film; she had two lines and five seconds of screen time.27  
Without doubt, she was bamboozled by the filmmaker, who claimed he was 
creating an action-adventure thriller set in ancient Arabia.28 Instead, the 
filmmaker dubbed over her few lines and turned the film into an anti-Islam 
movie called Innocence of Muslims.29 When a 14-minute trailer of the film 
was translated into Arabic in September 2012 and uploaded on YouTube, it 
sparked outrage and violent protests across Middle East.30 The video has 
even been linked to the Benghazi attack, although that point is hotly 
disputed.31 The film was called “amateurish”32 and “offensive.”33 Most 
viewers would agree it was a ham-handed attack on Islam, but should it have 
been banned under copyright law? 
 
 26.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). In the interest of full disclosure, 
I authored the en banc opinion in this case. 
 27.  Id. at 737. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 737–38. 
 31.  Id. at 738. 
 32.  Michael Joseph Gross, Disaster Movie, VANITY FAIR (Dec. 27, 2012), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2012/12/making-of-innocence-of-muslims (last visited Nov. 30, 
2015) (describing the film as “[e]xceptionally amateurish, with disjointed dialogue, jumpy editing, and 
performances that would have looked melodramatic even in a silent movie”). 
 33.  Max Fisher, The Movie So Offensive that Egyptians Just Stormed the U.S. Embassy Over It, 
TʜᴇATLANTIC (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/the-movie-so-
offensive-that-egyptians-just-stormed-the-us-embassy-over-it/262225/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
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Garcia first filed suit against both the filmmaker and Google in 
California state court under various tort theories—defamation, hate speech 
and right of publicity among them—and got nowhere.34 The state court 
refused to issue a takedown order, ruling that Garcia was not likely to 
succeed on the merits.35 
Five months after the film had been uploaded to YouTube, Garcia 
turned to federal court and asked the court to order removal of the film from 
Google’s sites under a theory of copyright infringement.36 The district court 
denied the injunction based on the weak copyright claim and the absence of 
irreparable harm.37  The initial Ninth Circuit panel, over a dissent, reversed 
the denial of the injunction and concluded that Garcia had a “fairly 
debatable” copyright claim in her five-second performance, and that threats 
against her were cognizable as irreparable harm.38 
The panel first issued a secret takedown order—saying that Google had 
to remove all copies of Innocence of Muslims within 24 hours and couldn’t 
disclose the existence of the order. It then revised the takedown order to 
include only versions of the film featuring Garcia’s performance. Despite the 
court’s dubious role as film editor, the result was no surprise—the entire film 
remained off the Internet. 
The Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc. The en banc court (10-1) 
affirmed the district court—dissolving the injunction against airing the film. 
Judge Kozinski, the lone dissenter, echoed the opinion he authored on behalf 
of the initial panel. The central reason for the majority’s decision: Garcia 
was not likely to succeed on her copyright claim and she had shown no 
copyright harm.39 Three important takeaways emerge from the legal analysis: 
1) handwaving does not make a copyright; 2) copyright remedies must fit 
copyright principles; and 3) a weak copyright claim cannot trump the First 
Amendment. 
Turning to the first of these points—copyright protection rests on a 
precise statutory scheme and you can’t just wave your hands and say 
something seems like it should be copyrightable. To begin, Garcia’s five-
second performance is not a work, separate and apart from the film in which 
it appears.  One can’t “cherry pick” bits and pieces from a unitary work.  
 
 34.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. She also revived her state law claims against the film maker in the complaint, although her 
request for injunctive relief was only on the copyright claim. Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 935 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 733. 
 39.  Garcia, 786 F.3d at 745. 
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Garcia’s theory would make “swiss cheese” of copyright law—the practical 
result would be fragmenting a movie into thousands of copyrights.40  Fight 
scenes in Lord of the Rings or the crowds in Ben Hur come to mind.41 
The Copyright Office—to which the court deferred42—denied Garcia’s 
effort to register a copyright, saying its “longstanding practices do not allow 
a copyright claim by an individual actor or actress in his or her performance 
contained within a motion picture.”  While the Copyright Act doesn’t define 
“works of authorship,” it was clear that Garcia was not the “author” of her 
fleeting performance.43 The film maker, not Garcia, fixed her performance, 
and Garcia certainly didn’t authorize the fixation.44  The parties disputed 
whether there was a work for hire agreement, but that question was not 
presented on appeal, and so did not factor into the analysis.  But, of course, 
in many situations, these copyright disputes in the movie world are governed 
by such agreements. 
A second important lesson is that there was no irreparable harm in the 
copyright sense.  Indeed, there was a fundamental mismatch between 
Garcia’s claimed harm (death threats and reputational harm) and the purpose 
of the copyright laws (to stimulate creative expression, not to protect 
secrecy).45  In criminal law lingo—the punishment didn’t fit the crime. The 
court was very sympathetic to Garcia’s plight, but copyright laws were not 
the right vehicle for her legitimate beef: “Although we do not take lightly 
threats to life or the emotional turmoil Garcia has endured, her harms are 
untethered from—and incompatible with—copyright and copyright’s 
function as the engine of expression. In broad terms, ‘the protection of 
privacy is not a function of the copyright law . . . .’”46 
American copyright law generally doesn’t embrace moral rights, i.e. 
reputational harm, or the right to be forgotten,47 although the latter principle 
 
 40.  Id. at 742. 
 41.  Id. at 742–43. 
 42.  Id. at 741–42. 
 43.  Id. at 743–44. 
 44.  Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression 
when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of 
more than transitory duration.”). 
 45.  Garcia, 786 F.3d at 745. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Martina Hinojosa, Challenges for Emerging Art Forms under the Visual Artists Rights Act, 11 
J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 433, 438–40 (2013) (noting that, in the United States, “moral rights are 
difficult to construe,” but recognizing that there is some tradition of moral rights protection in various 
pockets of copyright law). 
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was recently validated by the European Court of Justice.48 Perhaps Garcia 
would have had a better outcome and her privacy interests would have been 
treated differently had she been in Europe. She may also have fared better if 
her claim for an injunction had not been limited to a copyright theory. At the 
end of the day, though, the essence “of Garcia’s harm [was] untethered from 
her commercial interests as a performer,”49 which is the primary interest that 
copyright protects if it protects her claimed work at all. 
Finally, the most significant principle from the case is that a weak 
copyright claim cannot hijack the First Amendment. The initial order to 
remove the film from  YouTube was both a mandatory injunction and a prior 
restraint of speech—remedies that face high legal hurdles, are particularly 
disfavored and put a “heavy burden” on the plaintiff to overcome.50 In the 
end, the court concluded that the First Amendment implications were too 
important to ignore.  We held that “[t]he takedown order . . . gave short shrift 
to the First Amendment values at stake.  The mandatory injunction censored 
and suppressed a politically significant film—based on a dubious and 
unprecedented theory of copyright. In so doing, the panel deprived the public 
of the ability to view firsthand, and judge for themselves, a film at the center 
of an international uproar.”51 
III.   A LITIGATION COTTAGE INDUSTRY 
Garcia’s case does not stand alone—it is one among many where 
plaintiffs invoked copyright to halt personal attacks. Recently, high-profile 
data breaches or email hacks have prompted victims to look to copyright law 
for protection of their image or reputation. Let me offer two case vignettes 
as examples: Exhibit A and Exhibit B. Together, they echo the same 
principles as Garcia, but with two different outcomes.  Of course, this result 
should be no surprise—facts matter. 
Exhibit A: This case, Bollea v. Gawker Media, stems from the high-
profile legal fight between Hulk Hogan and Gawker, the news and gossip 
website, and it highlights the principle from Garcia v. Google that copyright 
 
 48.  See Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD), Case C-131/12,  
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (May 13, 2014). 
 49.  Garcia, 786 F.3d at 746. 
 50.  Id. at 747. 
 51.  Id.; see also Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 2015) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from 
the denial of emergency rehearing en banc) (arguing that the court should have had an emergency en banc 
hearing to avoid irreparable harm to First Amendment rights rather than awaiting the en banc hearing in 
due course). 
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is not the answer to your privacy prayers.52 Gawker posted a sex tape of Hulk 
Hogan having an affair with a mistress. Hogan first pursued a preliminary 
injunction under a copyright theory in federal court. He wanted the video 
pulled off Gawker’s website. The federal district court in Tampa, Florida, 
denied Hogan’s request for an injunction because the only harms were 
personal harm and harm “to his professional image due to the ‘private’ nature 
of the Video’s content.”53  Those claims are not “irreparable harm in the 
context of copyright infringement.”54 The episode so far mirrors the Garcia 
v. Google case.  Hogan moved his focus to his already-filed state court 
invasion of privacy/emotional distress claims.55  He had more success there: 
in 2013, the state court granted Hogan’s request for a preliminary injunction 
and ordered Gawker to remove the tape.56  Hogan is seeking $100 million in 
damages. The case remains pending.57 
Exhibit B: The next case, Monge v. Maya Magazines,58 highlights two 
of the principles from Garcia v. Google—the obligation to follow the 
statutory provisions of copyright law (in this case the fair use principles) and 
the intersection of the First Amendment and copyright law—in a suit that 
was more about privacy than innovation. 
Two music pop stars sued a magazine—TV Notas—for copyright 
infringement after the magazine printed photos of their secret Las Vegas 
wedding.  The whole story had the feel of a “telenovela.”59 The previously 
unpublished photos were obtained from a disgruntled former driver who 
found the photos on a pen drive in an ashtray in the car.60 The district court 
held for the magazine on fair use grounds, saying the photos were 
newsworthy.61 The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the commercial 
publication was not transformative and could not be considered “fair use” 
 
 52.  Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2012). 
 53.  Id. at 1327. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Peter Sterne, Gawker in the Fight of Its Life with Hulk Hogan Sex-Tape Suit, POLITICOMEDIA 
BETA (Jun. 12, 2015), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/media/2015/06/8570075/gawker-fight-its-
life-hulk-hogan-sex-tape-suit (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Diana Falzone, Trial Date Set in $100 Million Hulk Hogan vs. Gawker Lawsuit, FOX411 (Jul. 
30, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2015/07/30/hulk-hogan-gawker-trial-date-set/ (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
 58.  Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012). In the interest of full 
disclosure, I authored the opinion in this case. 
 59.  Id. at 1168. 
 60.  Id. at 1169. 
 61.  Id. at 1170. 
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(the copyright status of the photos was not before the court on appeal and 
was left to the district court to consider on remand).62 
This was not an easy case, especially because the magazine claimed that 
the newsworthiness of the photos trumped the copyright interest.  But like in 
all cases—facts matter, and application of the fair use factors favored the 
singers.63 
Although fair use is not a “get out of jail free card” for news 
organizations,64 the court must be very sensitive to the First Amendment 
dimensions of the newsworthiness defense.  Nonetheless, the court’s charge 
is to look at the fair use factors as a whole. A court cannot sidestep the fair 
use statutory criteria: i.e., the “purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes,” the “nature of the copyrighted work,” the “amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole,” and the “effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.”65 
In a case like Monge, one can fairly question whether fair use provides 
a sufficient “internal safety valve”66 for First Amendment values. My 
colleague in dissent thought not.  The dissent noted the censorial nature of 
the copyright action, arguing that celebrities could now “invoke copyright 
protection to prevent the media’s disclosure of any embarrassing or 
incriminating works by claiming that such images were intended only for 
private use.”67 
These are but two of a steady stream of cases in federal courts where 
one side invokes copyright to protect personal interests and the other side 
counters that copyright is tantamount to censorship. Other examples include 
the following: 
•   A woman challenged Hustler’s publication of her wet T-shirt 
contest photo.  The Sixth Circuit upheld the jury’s rejection of the 
fair use defense, despite the newsworthiness of the article.68 
•   A Miami businessman and partial owner of the Miami Heat filed a 
copyright infringement suit against a blogger who apparently made 
 
 62.  Id. at 1173–77. 
 63.  Id. at 1184. 
 64.  Monge, 688 F.3d at 1183. 
 65.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 66.  Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (2001). 
 67.  Monge, 688 F.3d at 1184 (M. Smith, J., dissenting). 
 68.  Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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it his mission to criticize the businessman and posted an 
unflattering image of him. The blogger initially won on a summary 
judgment motion raising a fair use defense.69 The trial court’s 
decision garnered attention in the First Amendment blogosphere, 
where the headline read “Copyright as Censorship.”70 The Eleventh 
Circuit recently affirmed the trial court, concluding that “[d]ue to 
[the businessman’s] attempt to utilize copyright as an instrument of 
censorship against unwanted criticism, there is no potential market 
for his work.”71 
•   Another recent case was aptly described by law professor Rebecca 
Tushnet when she said, “If hard cases make bad law, it may also be 
that sometimes jerks make good law.”72 A student at Liberty 
University posted videos of the former dean that were intended to 
expose the former dean’s “dishonesty.”73 The dean first filed a 
takedown notice with YouTube.com and then filed a copyright 
infringement lawsuit.74 The embattled dean previously claimed to 
have been raised in a jihadi Muslim community and converted to 
evangelical Christianity. Those claims turned out to not be true.75 
The dean lost his university position, and he also lost his copyright 
claim in court.76 
IV.   COPYRIGHT AS THE GO-TO TOOL 
Why, you might ask, has copyright become the go-to legal tool to 
prevent the spread of damaging or offensive information on the Internet? For 
starters, the Internet is a game changer in this field. By its nature, the Internet 
is a platform for political and civic speech ensuring frequent and emotional 
clashes over the spread of information. To say the Internet is ubiquitous 
understates its reach.  With more than 3 billion users worldwide77—more 
 
 69.  Katz v. Chevaldina, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (Fla. 2012). 
 70.  David Post, Copyright as Censorship? Katz v. Chevaldina, WASH. POST (May 11, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/11/copyright-as-censorship-
katz-v-chevaldina/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
 71.  Katz v. Chevaldina, No. 14-14525, slip op. at 11 (11th Cir. 2015), 
https://www.eff.org/files/2015/09/17/katz_opinion.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
 72.  Rebecca Tushnet, Fair Use Twofer: Motion to Dismiss and Summary Judgment for Critical 
Uses, REBECCA TUSHNET (May 15, 2014), http://tushnet.com/2014/05/15/fair-use-twofer-motion-to-
dismiss-and-summary-judgment-for-critical-uses/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
 73.  Caner v. Autry, 16 F. Supp. 3d 689, 693 (W.D. Va. May 14, 2014). 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 692. 
 76.  Id. at 692, 714–15. 
 77.  INTERNET USERS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
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than 1.44 billion on Facebook monthly78—the potential for copyright 
infringement (and creativity) is unlimited, and the potential damage to 
reputation and loss of privacy is often incalculable.  The Internet knows no 
borders.  So, in many respects, the lid comes off the traditional principles of 
territorial jurisdiction, national privacy laws, and other long-established 
jurisprudence, such as third-party infringement. 
In addition to these reasons, I suggest six other factors influencing the 
growing use of copyright to protect privacy interests and censor damaging 
information. 
A.  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA) 
The DMCA79 is a very potent statute—Internet content providers 
receive a safe harbor from liability if they remove content after receiving a 
takedown notice,80 so there is a powerful incentive for them to accede to 
those demands.  This is a unique and often effective mechanism to remove 
unfavorable content from the Internet. Of course, Internet content providers 
do not always accede to those demands—Garcia v. Google is a good 
example. Google/YouTube refused to comply with the multiple takedown 
notices filed by Garcia.81 
B.   The Power of the Copyright Act 
Assertion of a copyright claim results in federal question 
jurisdiction82—i.e., a free pass into federal court.  In contrast, most privacy-
based tort harms arise under state law and there may be no federal 
jurisdiction, depending on the citizenship of the parties. Significantly, 
copyright is essentially a strict liability regime; there is no need to show any 
intent to infringe on the part of the defendant.83 For a successful plaintiff, the 
 
 78.  Emil Protalinski, Facebook Passes 1.44B Monthly Active Users and 1.25B Mobile Users; 65% 
Are Now Daily Users, VENTURE BEAT (Apr. 22, 2015), http://venturebeat.com/2015/04/22/facebook-
passes-1-44b-monthly-active-users-1-25b-mobile-users-and-936-million-daily-users/ (last visited Nov. 
30, 2015). 
 79.  Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. & 28 U.S.C.). 
 80.  17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
 81.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 82.  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (providing for original jurisdiction in federal court over “all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”). 
 83.  Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 21, 1995) (noting that “copyright is a strict liability statute”); but see CoStar Grp., Inc. v. 
LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 558 (4th Cir. 2004) (discussing the ways that the Internet has put pressure 
on the strict liability regime of the Copyright Act). 
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damages are substantial and can add up very quickly.  The Act provides for 
up to $30,000 for infringement of a single work, and that number can also 
go up to $150,000 if the infringement is willful.84 
All of this means that the Copyright Act is a powerful tool, whatever 
the motive for filing suit. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation stated: 
“Stern threats making vague claims about ‘stolen intellectual property’ are 
often effective even if there’s no legal merit to them. In part that’s because 
copyright law’s penalties are so far out of proportion to any actual harm.”85 
C.   Pitfalls of the Fair Use Defense 
As discussed earlier, the fair use factor-based test is not a model of 
predictability and is necessarily driven by particular facts in particular 
cases.86 This reality puts these cases in play in terms of the uncertainty of the 
outcome. 
D.   Availability of Injunctive Relief 
Historically, it has not been difficult to show “irreparable harm” in the 
intellectual property context.87 For much of the twentieth century, it was 
possible to waltz into court on a presumption. In a 1955 copyright case, for 
example, the Second Circuit found that “[w]hen a prima facie case for 
copyright infringement has been made, plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary 
injunction without a detailed showing of danger of irreparable harm.”88 
In 2006, however, the presumption began to erode. The Supreme Court 
held in eBay v. MercExchange that a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction 
in a patent case must satisfy the four traditional factors for equitable relief: 
namely, irreparable injury, inadequacy of money damages, balance of 
hardships and public interest.89 The irreparable injury factor could not be 
presumed. The Supreme Court made it relatively easy for lower courts to 
extend eBay’s logic into copyright cases, as much of its reasoning rested on 
an analogy between the Patent Act and the Copyright Act.90 
 
 84.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). 
 85.  David Kravets, Ashley Madison Abusing DMCA “To Put Genie Back in the Bottle,” EFF Says, 
ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 27, 2015), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/08/ashley-madison-abusing-
dmca-to-put-genie-back-in-the-bottle-eff-says/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
 86.  See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text. 
 87.  See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 5, at 158 (noting that the courts “have come close to 
eliminating the irreparable injury rule altogether” in the context of the Copyright Act of 1976). 
 88.  Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434, 436 (2d Cir. 1955). 
 89.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 90.  Id. at 392–93. 
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One of the earliest circuits to extend eBay to copyright was the Fourth 
Circuit. In Christopher Phelps & Associates v. Galloway, the court found 
that a copyright plaintiff must show irreparable harm to obtain an injunction. 
The court noted, however, that copyright violations in fact often cause 
irreparable injury because they deprive the copyright holder of intangible 
exclusive rights.91 The Second Circuit extended eBay’s holding to the 
preliminary injunction context in a copyright case brought by J.D. Salinger 
against another author whose work incorporated Salinger’s famous character 
Holden Caulfield. The court held that, after eBay, district courts could no 
longer rely on the presumption and that plaintiffs needed to present evidence 
that failure to issue an injunction would actually cause irreparable harm.92 
Because the presumption of irreparable harm no longer holds sway in 
copyright cases, litigants are searching for harm, sometimes in the privacy 
and personal harm arena. A preliminary injunction is a powerful remedy that 
is often the death knell of the case and may force settlement or abandonment 
of the case.  If the injunction is wrongly issued in a case turning on the First 
Amendment, free speech may be suppressed without a trial or all the 
evidence.93 Thus, even after eBay, the use of preliminary injunctions still has 
great appeal to those who would use copyright as a vehicle to advance 
privacy interests or who hope to quell speech. 
E.  Porous and Imperfect Privacy Protections in the United States 
The law often moves to fill a gap—just so with litigants trying to fill 
the privacy gap with copyright.  In the United States, we do not have a highly 
structured and protective privacy regime.94  Unlike Europeans, who enjoy 
the coverage offered by the European Union’s data and privacy directives,95 
we essentially have no overarching federal “Privacy Law.”  To be sure, the 
Fourth Amendment provides important privacy rights in the context of 
government searches.96  And the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments’ 
 
 91.  492 F.3d 532, 544 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 92.  Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 82 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 93.  Pamela Samuelson & Krzysztof Bebenek, Why Plaintiffs Should Have to Prove Irreparable 
Harm in Copyright Preliminary Injunction Cases, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 67, 68 (2010) 
(observing that the presumption of irreparable harm ignores the defendant’s right to free expression, 
particularly in transformative use copyright cases). 
 94.  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CAL. L. REV. 2007 (2010). 
 95.  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data, 1995 O.J. L 281/31; Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic 
Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. L 201/37. 
 96.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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privacy penumbra has been invoked in limited contexts.97  While some state 
constitutions offer much broader protection, statutory protection is generally 
scattershot and focused on specific areas, such as medical information, 
banking data, data held by the federal government and the like.  The result is 
that copyright injunctions have been used as a proxy for privacy protection. 
F.  Cultural Shifts 
Finally, to a degree, some of the trend in seeking protection under the 
copyright umbrella may be attributable to a cultural shift in attitudes about 
free expression. In his book Trigger Warning, a British journalist, who at 
one time wrote for a libertarian Marxist publication, wrote: 
In normal circumstances we in the West now spend far more time 
discussing how to restrict and outlaw types of speech than how to defend 
and extend that precious liberty. Almost everybody in public life pays lip 
service to the principle of free speech. Scratch the surface, however, and 
in practice most will add the inevitable “But . . . ” to button that lip and 
put a limit on liberty.98 
There are many examples to back that observation.  In the 1980s, the 
Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa for the acclaimed author Salman Rushdie 
after Rushdie published the allegedly sacrilegious Satanic Verses. While 
many advocates for free speech supported Rushdie, the response was not 
unequivocal.  Likewise, the same views and emotions played out with the 
more recent tragic events involving the French publication Charlie Hebdo 
and the massacre of its editor and staff. The point is that we don’t have 
cultural homogeneity about the contours of free speech. 
Another cultural trend is the evolving and continually shifting view on 
the importance and role of copyright. It is not unusual to see Napster-
generation “pirates” turned advocates for intellectual property, as author 
Joshua Cohen recently demonstrated. Despite being part of a “test 
generation” for whom “[e]verything was free . . . or felt free,” Cohen now 
says that “culture has to be paid for, if not with money or even praise, then 
with time and attention. There are more things to hear and see and read than 
ever before, but the cheaper it is to get your hands on them, the cheaper your 
appreciation of them will be.”99 In contrast, others view copyright as 
 
 97.  See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
 98.  MICK HUME, TRIGGER WARNING: IS THE FEAR OF BEING OFFENSIVE KILLING FREE SPEECH? 
15 (2015). 
 99.  What the Internet’s Free Culture Has Cost Us in Art, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 2, 2015), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/internets-free-culture-cost-us-art/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
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crushing creativity.100 As with the ongoing debate on free speech, the debate 
over copyright values is heated and intense. 
How much the recent copyright-as-censorship cases are driven by 
societal or cultural trends is an open question, but one worth pondering. 
V.   CONCEPTUALIZING THE NEW TENSION—BACK TO FIRST 
AMENDMENT BASICS 
In closing, I suggest that we return to copyright and First Amendment 
basics. Looping back to where I started, the use of copyright law to censor 
unpopular speech is conceptually distinct from the “crowding out” problem, 
and it is an issue that deserves our attention.101 The Supreme Court may have 
foreshadowed the censorial use of copyright. In Harper & Row, the Court 
hinted that copyright could not become “an instrument to suppress facts,” 
impliedly recognizing that copyright could have a censorial effect on specific 
instances of offensive speech or unpleasant facts.102 
The next step is to recognize that the conceptually distinct problem of 
“copyright as censorship” sounds in the traditional concerns of First 
Amendment jurisprudence. It is therefore deserving of, and more susceptible 
to, judicial scrutiny than the more intractable policy debates pertinent to the 
“crowding out” tension. The intersection of fair use and the First Amendment 
is fertile ground for judicial and legislative development. Although the 
Supreme Court singles out fair use as one of copyright’s accommodations of 
the First Amendment, fair use is subject to legitimate challenge because of 
its imprecise nature and application. The ying and yang of copyright and the 
First Amendment needs some give in the joints. 
Ultimately, copyright cannot be everything to everybody.  Our legal 
system, starting with the Constitution, protects the expression of ideas.  No 
matter how noble and important the values of privacy and protection of 
reputation, copyright is not the direct vehicle for their vindication. 
For now, it is simply my hope to have delivered this important message: 
Censorship in the guise of authorship and copyright is a trend that calls on 
us to stand up and take notice.  This is not about freeing Mickey Mouse—it 
is about making sure that copyright’s safety valves give full play to a robust 
First Amendment. The principles and framework are in place—what remains 
is to insure a robust interpretation and application.  That, of course, is why 
 
 100.  See McGowan supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 101.  See Eisgruber supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 102.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985). 
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we have smart law students, learned professors in the academy, and strong 
advocates among lawyers. I put that challenge in your good hands. 
I leave you with one final thought—in the world of copyright, there is 
no accounting for the divergence in taste and artistic appreciation. When a 
group of monkeys took selfies using a camera left by a nature photographer, 
a news syndicate claimed copyright on the photos on behalf of the British 
photographer.103 Smart as they are, it was hard for the monkeys to mount a 
defense.  Now an animal rights group has filed a copyright lawsuit on behalf 
of the monkeys.104 My response: so much for monkey business. 
 
 103.  Justin Wm. Moyer, Monkey Wants Copyright and Cash from ‘Monkey Selfies,’ PETA Lawsuit 
Says, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2015/09/23/monkey-wants-copyright-and-cash-from-monkey-selfies-peta-lawsuit-says/ (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
 104.  Id. 
